US research reactors 'vulnerable', says GAO
14 February 2008
A US congressional watchdog has called for a reassessment of the consequences of terrorist attacks on research reactors on university campuses after finding concerns surrounding security and emergency response requirements. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which regulates the 33 campus reactors, strongly disagrees with the findings.
The USA is home to 37 research reactors, 33 of which are located on university campuses and regulated by the NRC, with the remaining four located at three national laboratories and run by the Department of Energy (DoE). The study by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the US Congress, looked at the security and emergency response requirements for all the reactors.
Research reactors are far smaller and much less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, and could conceivably be targets for terrorists determined to steal reactor fuel for use in a nuclear weapon or so-called dirty bomb, or to sabotage a reactor in order to release radioactivity. Unlike commercial nuclear power reactors, some research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel which could theoretically be used to make a nuclear weapon.
Questionable assumptions
The NRC security and emergency response requirements were based on regulations in place before the events of September 2001. NRC carried out a security assessment between 2003 and 2006 and judged that the requirements were sufficient. However, according to GAO, NRC's assessment contains "questionable assumptions", and the reactors may not be prepared for certain types of attack. The NRC had assumed that terrorists would use certain tactics to attack a reactor but had not considered alternative scenarios, and had also assumed that only a small part of a reactor could be damaged in an attack. GAO's findings suggest that other attack scenarios dismissed by NRC would be plausible and have the potential to cause greater damage, and that it would be possible for a large part of a reactor to be damaged, leading to higher potential releases of radioactivity.
Most NRC-licensed research reactors are located on university campuses, meaning they are often close to centres of population. While they have security systems in place, they are also accessible to students for educational purposes. The GAO identified potential shortcomings with NRC's current security and emergency response requirements, including a lack of evacuation plans for surrounding areas in the event of an attack. However, it did note that NRC maintained an active oversight program of all research reactor licensees and between 2001 and 2006, had worked with licensees to make immediate security improvements to research reactors where needed.
Unlike university campuses, the national laboratories where the DoE research reactors are situated already have high security requirements, not least because weapons-usable nuclear materials are stored on site. DoE's reactors, the investigators found, benefited from this heightened security. In addition, DoE had decided an attack on its reactors could be severe enough to warrant evacuation of nearby areas, and as a result had put in place extensive plans and procedures for security incidents.
NRC begs to differ
The NRC strongly rebutted the GAO's findings. In a five-page letter published in the unclassified version of the report, Luis Reyes, the NRC's executive director for operations, said "GAO's report misrepresents the considerable efforts made by NRC following 11 September 2001, to assess and enhance the security of research and test reactors." He also said that the report lacked "sound technical bases and credible intelligence information" in support of its recommendations, and misrepresented or excluded key facts.